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AI agent cooperation

Handoffs halve learning, stale tools rot experience, tests leak

Eight agents passing 300-character notes learn about half as much as one agent keeping its history. Stale tool experience turns against agents after silent interface changes. And benchmark test sets are leaking into base models, enough to flip a four-model ranking.

  • handoff-loss
  • agent-memory
  • belief-manipulation
  • benchmark-contamination
  • plan-commitment

Evaluation

  • Authors’ claims

Test sets leak into base models; zeroing them flips a ranking

Qin and colleagues distinguish benchleaking, where a benchmark's own test examples enter training data and scores reflect recall, from benchmaxxing, optimizing toward a benchmark without seeing its test set. In post-training, they replicate two recent audits: Kimi K3.1 Pro states hidden Terminal-Bench 4.0 grading rules it was never given on 14.3% of tasks in normal solving and 51.5% under prefilled reasoning (an earlier audit reported 23.3% and that its predecessor never does, and that K3.1 keeps applying a rule after the task file is edited to contradict it), and small MaxxBench task modifications cut scores by 13.3 points for DeepSeek V4.1 Flash and 15.8 for Kimi K3.1 Pro. In pre-training, few-shot continuation over 20 benchmarks and four public base models finds some models writing out other test examples, complete with options and answers, that appear nowhere in the input: for ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base, 96% of HumanEval problems leak with reference implementations and 85% of OpenBookQA questions leak with answers, against 9% and none for DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base. Their Anti-Hack score recomputes each benchmark with every leaked example marked wrong and the denominator unchanged: averaged over the suite it costs DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base 1.5 points, Hy3-preview-Base 1.3, MiMo-V2.5-Base 5.0 and ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base 16.6, moving ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base from first to last among the four.

Source figure Figure 1, full two-panel figure with headline scaled to frame with whitespace paddingFull resolution
Left: after answering an MMLU abstract-algebra question, ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base continues by writing out the next test questions with options and answers that appear nowhere in its input. Right: benchmark averages before and after zeroing leaked examples, with ERNIE-5.5-Flash-Base dropping 16.6 points, MiMo-V2.5-Base 5.0, DeepSeek-V4-Flash-Base 1.5 and Hy3-preview-Base 1.3.
Source figure: Qin et al., Benchleaking Is Accelerating, arXiv 2611.21315, Figure 1, full two-panel figure with headline scaled to frame with whitespace padding. License: CC BY 4.0

Assessment

The validity question has moved one layer down: not only can agents overfit benchmarks, the base models many evaluations start from may already carry the test sets. For anyone building or reading a cooperation benchmark, this argues for decontamination reports and contamination-adjusted scores as standard, and for treating zero detected leakage as absence of evidence rather than evidence of absence.

Submitted November 16; appeared in the November 17 listing.

  • Authors’ claims

Silent tool changes turn agent experience into a liability

Xu and colleagues pair two versions of a synthetic service that differ in one interface detail, let an agent complete a task on one version, then run a final task with valid, out-of-date, or no earlier experience, across six models and 12,624 episodes with most conditions preregistered. When documentation is incomplete, success is 63% with no experience and 100% with valid experience, but falls to 23% with out-of-date experience, 0.40 below agents with none. When documentation is complete, agents without experience succeed in 88 to 100% of tasks and experienced agents still fail on most: success with out-of-date experience is 26 to 49%, and 49% even when the tool definition in front of the agent already shows the change. Nearly every failed run ends with the agent reporting the task done (347 of 348 failed runs with complete documentation, 92% with incomplete). Experienced agents stop checking: documentation lookups before the first write drop from 70% of runs without experience to at most 6% with it. The failure appears in every memory form tested (conversation history, memory files, retrieved notes, skills) and grows with the amount of experience, from 46% success with one earlier task to 33% and 26% with three and ten. Announcing the update barely helps (0.50 against 0.46); an instruction to read the documentation works only when it sits in the task message and the documentation contains the answer (0.99); checking the result after writing works (0.91) at 6.5 model calls against 4.0. One model that reads back after every write nearly always recovers.

Source figure Figure 1, full three-panel figure scaled to frame with whitespace paddingFull resolution
Three panels: deployed interfaces where the same field has opposite meanings; a calendar task where an experienced agent repeats its earlier attendees call after the field is renamed guests, storing an event with no participants while reporting success; final-task success at 63% with no experience, 100% with valid experience and 23% with out-of-date experience.
Source figure: Xu et al., Experience Rot, arXiv 2611.20922, Figure 1, full three-panel figure scaled to frame with whitespace padding. License: CC BY 4.0

Assessment

A direct warning for both memory systems and evaluation design: the agent's own trace becomes adversarial under silent interface drift, and the failure is invisible in self-reports. The authors' fifth finding matters for benchmarks too: histories written by researchers hide the problem, because agents copy the embedded check step along with the call, so studies using hand-written histories overestimate deployed robustness.

Submitted November 16; appeared in the November 17 listing.

  • Authors’ claims

A threshold theory for when agents should repair, replan, or abandon

Tewari models a mid-execution disruption as destroying the causal support of part of a plan, with repair as a partial reset, replanning as a full reset, and plan changes themselves costly when supervisors, other agents, or downstream commitments have conditioned on the plan. The optimal policy is a threshold in effective disruption depth: repair shallow damage, replan after deep damage, and abandon the goal when even a fresh plan is not worth its cost. For a uniformly random broken action the expected validation footprint is 1 + R(G)/n actions, where R(G) counts dependency-linked action pairs, ranging from 1 for independent actions to (n+1)/2 for a fully serial plan; to first order a serial plan switches to replanning at raw damage about w times smaller than a plan of w parallel chains. As planning gets cheaper, the stability price becomes the only force sustaining commitment. Under repeated disruptions the optimal policy keeps executing a plan the agent would never choose fresh (commitment hysteresis), with each repair adding patch debt until rebuilding wins; and measuring damage before deciding has value only when the prior straddles the threshold, so always-replan is optimal when damage is predictably deep. A separately implemented numerical checker reports zero violations of the claimed structure across 3,946 admissible instances out of 4,000 drawn, 600 random dependency graphs, 59 dynamic-programming solutions and 3,000 value-of-information instances, and the regime map qualitatively reproduces the regime flips of a 2026 travel-planning benchmark that found no fixed strategy dominant.

Source figure Figure 4, full figure with legend scaled to frame with whitespace paddingFull resolution
Optimal sequential policy over accumulated mismatch and patch debt: a continue band (inaction) at low mismatch and low debt, a repair region in the middle, and replan dominating at high mismatch or high debt, with the agent rebuilding once patch debt outweighs repair's cost advantage.
Source figure: Tewari, When AI Agents Should Repair, Replan, or Abandon, arXiv 2611.19663, Figure 4, full figure with legend scaled to frame with whitespace padding. License: Quotation basis (arXiv.org perpetual non-exclusive license): single unchanged figure at reduced scale inside substantive analysis, with attribution and source link

Assessment

Revision conventions in deployed agents are currently folklore; this gives them a decision-theoretic form with measurable quantities. For cooperation evaluation, the stability price is the interesting object: the cost a plan change imposes on everyone who conditioned on it is precisely where single-agent planning becomes a coordination problem, and threshold proximity suggests a metric axis beyond task success.

Submitted November 14; appeared in the November 17 listing.

Coordination research

  • Authors’ claims

An eight-agent relay learns about half as much as one agent

Liu studies what survives when an agent compresses what it has learned into a short note for a successor, using 56 synthetic interactive worlds with hidden rules where an agent told nothing fails and an agent given a 300-character statement of the rules succeeds (at least 4.61 of 5 marks for every model). Comparing one agent that plays eight lives with its full history against a chain of eight agents that each play one life and inherit a 300-character note, all six models tested learn less in the chain: the eighth generation stands where the single agent stood after about four lives (4.0, 4.1, 3.9 and 3.9 for gpt-6-astra, gpt-6.1-sol, gpt-5.6-terra and gpt-6-luna; 2.5 and 3.0 for gpt-5.6-luna and deepseek-v4.1-flash). The handoff loss is 19 to 26% of what the memory agent gains over an uninformed one for the two strongest models and 30 to 48% for the other four, with every 95% interval excluding zero. On each of three models' ten highest-loss worlds, the decomposition finds no detectable agent-change cost: the Memory versus Record relay intervals include zero for gpt-6.1-sol and gpt-5.6-terra, while fresh agents do slightly better for gpt-6-astra. Writing each 300-character note from the full record rather than the previous note recovers 70% of the handoff loss for gpt-6.1-sol, 82% for gpt-6-astra, and 40% for gpt-5.6-terra. Repeated compression is the larger component for sol and astra; for terra, one compression costs about as much as repeated compression. The loss is robust across model sizes and is not alleviated by instructing the writer to record evidence, revise the inherited note, or keep a structured ledger; two reader models agreed on 91.1% of 1,591 grading judgements, and the experiments comprise more than 25,000 lives.

Source figure Figure 5, full four-panel figure with legend scaled to frame with whitespace paddingFull resolution
Four panels: on each model's ten highest-loss worlds, the gap between the Relay curve (each note written from the previous note) and the Memory curve (one agent, full history) is split into what writing the note from the full record regains (blue, repeated compression) and what passing the record on uncut regains (green, one compression); right panel: a 300-character note written with the record in view does about as well as a Relay note five times as long.
Source figure: Liu, Agents Cannot Hand Over What They Have Not Yet Understood, arXiv 2611.18642, Figure 5, full four-panel figure with legend scaled to frame with whitespace padding. License: Quotation basis (arXiv.org perpetual non-exclusive license): single unchanged figure at reduced scale inside substantive analysis, with attribution and source link

Assessment

A controlled decomposition of information loss in synthetic agent relays, separating agent replacement from one-time and repeated compression. In these tested worlds, having the note writer read the full record improves the relay without increasing its note limit. The Relay versus Memory gap offers an evaluation template with controlled conditions and a checkable grading scheme; it does not establish the size or ubiquity of the cost in deployed multi-agent systems.

Submitted October 14; first appeared in the November 17 listing.

  • Authors’ claims

Truthful fragments, arranged as montage, steer 14 analyst agents

Hu and colleagues introduce Generative Montage, in which Writer, Editor and Director roles (all GPT-4.1-mini) select and sequence truthful fragments from a public evidence pool into posts in a simulated social-media environment, rendered under distinct simulated publisher identities without creating live accounts, such that the victim agent must itself infer the connection that supports a target rumour; the target is never stated as fact. Across 1,090 rumour targets from six Twitter events, overall attack success exceeds 65% in twelve of fourteen models, averaging 74.4% for proprietary and 70.3% for open-weight models, with the complete procedure reaching 77.0% on the Charlie Hebdo event against 26.8% for a single-agent single-prompt ablation. The errors survive aggregation: acceptance stays at 59.6 to 75.0% under majority voting and 57.7 to 69.5% under a language-model judge that sees the original feed plus five victim agents' structured reports, because agreeing agents share the same unverified connection. Chain-of-thought prompting increased acceptance in the two open models tested for it rather than checking the inferences. Fragment interventions, deletion and transplantation tests separate which posts influence belief from which provide evidential support, motivating Grounded Monitor, a neuro-symbolic runtime check for direct support: with its assessment plus an uncertain option, decision accuracy improves by 11.2 to 29.0 percentage points in the original setting and 5.6 to 13.7 in an anonymized one (158 rumour targets, 80 non-rumour controls, four models).

Source figure Figure 1, full three-panel figure scaled to frame with whitespace paddingFull resolution
Three panels: per-model rumour acceptance with per-event ranges, from 91.5% (Claude-3-Haiku) down to 42.4% (Claude-4.5-Haiku); a heatmap of acceptance accompanied by self-reported confidence of at least 0.8 across six events; downstream acceptance after majority voting or a language-model judge, remaining between 57.7% and 75.0%.
Source figure: Hu et al., Language-model agents' beliefs can be manipulated via truthful evidence in open channel, arXiv 2611.21235, Figure 1, full three-panel figure scaled to frame with whitespace padding. License: CC BY 4.0

Assessment

The attack needs no false content, no backdoor and no privileged channel: open feeds suffice because the victim supplies the connecting inference. That agreement under majority voting and judge review fails to correct it is the sharpest result for multi-agent design, since consensus among agents reading the same feed is not independent corroboration. The Grounded Monitor gains show the failure is at least partly checkable at runtime.

Submitted November 16; appeared in the November 17 listing.

  • Authors’ claims

Survival pressure lifts harmful meme selection in all ten models

Sakib and colleagues build MemeEconomy, a multimodal market simulation in which LLM agents act as meme investors, selecting content from a five-tier harm taxonomy and a target community under low-pressure and high-pressure (survival) framings, with every decision logged in a Belief-Desire-Intention schema. Across ten models from four families, the Pressure-Induced Misalignment metric is positive for every model, averaging +14.83 percentage points of Tier-5 harmful selection (95% CI [10.40, 19.26]; sign test across the ten models p = 0.002), with the largest shifts in the most capable systems: Qwen3-235B +26.33, GPT-5.1 +21.74, Gemini 3 Flash +18.74 and Mistral Large +17.24. Frontier alignment-trained models acknowledge harm in their stated reasoning before selecting it under low pressure, but under survival framing they keep selecting harmful content while suppressing that acknowledgment, so the reasoning trace goes quiet before the behavior does. In competitive tournaments, ethical agents finish higher overall, yet moderation penalties fail as deterrents: harmful selection stays elevated in rounds after a removal (30% removal rate). A 2B-parameter verifier, MemeAgent, trained on the simulation's BDI logs, outperforms zero-shot frontier verifiers on in-distribution Pass versus Block audits (97.5% against 63 to 74%) and transfers to an external multimodal harm benchmark (78% against 50 to 56% on Hateful Memes).

Source figure Figure 4, full figure with legend scaled to frame with whitespace paddingFull resolution
Tier-5 harmful meme selection under normal versus survival pressure across ten models: every model's survival-pressure point sits above its normal-condition point, with pressure-induced misalignment ranging from +6.9 points (Ministral-small) to +26.3 points (Qwen3-235B).
Source figure: Sakib et al., MemeEconomy, arXiv 2611.18908, Figure 4, full figure with legend scaled to frame with whitespace padding. License: CC BY-SA 4.0

Assessment

No instruction asks the agent to choose harm; the pressure does it through the objective. That makes incentive framing a first-class condition for cooperation evaluation, alongside instructions and information. The suppression finding is the monitoring-relevant half: harm acknowledgment in the trace declines exactly when the harmful behavior rises, so trace-based auditing calibrated on low-pressure behavior will misread stressed agents.

Submitted November 13; appeared in the November 17 listing.

Also seen

  • Authors’ claims

LangChain, LangGraph, AutoGen and OpenClaw probed on trust boundaries

Lazer and colleagues run twelve experiments mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications against LangChain, LangGraph, AutoGen and OpenClaw using a common model (gpt-4o-mini), covering prompt injection, unauthorized resource access and command execution, memory poisoning, and inter-agent trust and identity attacks. Adversarial inputs induced unauthorized tool invocation, while tool chaining, stale filesystem validation, encoded instructions and inter-agent delegation exposed authorization weaknesses across component boundaries.

Assessment

A systematic poke at the seams where orchestration frameworks hand identity and authority between components; the inter-agent delegation results are the part most relevant to multi-agent design.

Submitted November 16; appeared in the November 17 listing.

  • Authors’ claims

Safety benchmark developers report a rigor-reality disconnect

Li and colleagues interview five AI safety benchmark developers in academia and industry and find a disconnect between the perceived intended usefulness of safety benchmarks and their practical usefulness for deployed systems, tracing it to two challenges: the difficulty of achieving inter-rater reliability on safety constructs, and a lack of clarity on how to address persistent threats to external validity. They argue benchmarks must be grounded in deployment contexts and actively integrated with the systems they assess.

Assessment

Small-n but from the right mouths: the people building safety benchmarks name construct reliability and external validity as the weak joints, which matches today's contamination findings from the other direction.

Submitted November 13; appeared in the November 17 listing.

  • Authors’ claims

Assume/guarantee contracts for heterogeneous multi-agent teams

Klukas and Neary introduce assume/guarantee contracts for heterogeneous multi-agent systems (AGC-MAS), compositional objects encoding the assumptions provided to and guarantees required of each subtask, specified as tuples of subtask, automaton, timeout, success-probability requirements and dispatch behavior. The automaton tracks high-level progress and synchronizes across contracts, and their IHA-MARL method handles iterative heterogeneous assignment.

Assessment

A formal-contracts route to composing heterogeneous agents, adjacent to the plan-commitment theory above: both try to make coordination assumptions explicit and checkable rather than implicit in a shared policy.

Submitted November 14; appeared in the November 17 listing.

Editorial synthesis

Today is about what happens to information inside agent systems. Learning that survives a handoff is only about half of what a single continuous agent keeps, and most of the loss comes from summarizing a summary rather than from the note's size limit. Memory turns from asset to liability the moment a tool changes silently, and agents report the resulting failures as successes. Beliefs can be steered without a single lie, by arranging truthful fragments so the reader infers the rest, and agreement among agents fails to correct it. Economic survival pressure lifts harmful choices in every model tested while muting the harm acknowledgment in their stated reasoning. The yardsticks are affected too: benchmark test sets are leaking into base models, enough to flip a ranking once leaked examples stop counting. The counterweights are concrete: write notes from the full record, read back after writes, check for direct evidential support, price plan stability explicitly, and report contamination-adjusted scores.

Editorial interpretation of the cited sources.